



P-51D The Galloping Ghost

September 16, 2011 Reno, NV


> Earl Weener, PhD Board Member

Accident Summary

- September 16, 2011
- 1625 Pacific daylight time
- Modified experimental P-51D, "The Galloping Ghost"
- Collided with ramp
- NCAR Unlimited Class Gold Race
- Pilot and 10 spectators fatal
- At least 64 spectators injured; at least 16 serious



Unlimited Race Course - 2011





Parties to the Investigation

- Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
- Reno-Tahoe Airport Authority (RTAA)
- Reno Air Racing Association (RARA)
- National Air-racing Group (NAG)
 Unlimited Division
- Aerodynamic Consulting, LLC
- RCAT Systems



NTSB Staff

- Howard Plagens
- Josh Cawthra
- Clint Crookshanks
- John Clark
- Dennis Crider
- Marie Moler
- Dan Horak
- Mike Bauer
- Chris Babcock
- Kelly Nantel
- Terry Williams
- Nicholas Worrell
- Christy Spangler

- Noel Coleman
- Cathy Gagne
- Dr. James Duncan
- Paul Suffern
- Derek Nash
- Elias Kontanis
- Max Green
- Eric Emery
- Michael Crook
- Jane Terry
- Jeffrey Marcus
- John Whitener



Accident Video





Accident Video – Half Speed






Accident Sequence

- Performance study
- Video study
- Image study
- Correlated telemetry, photos, and video
- Left roll upset at 1624:28.9








T+0.14 seconds

Photo by Jonathan Apfelbaum



T+0.27 seconds





T+0.56 seconds







Photo by Jonathan Apfelbaum







T+1.44 seconds





T+3.4 seconds










T+4.6 seconds




Airplane Motion







Vertical Load Factor




















Structural Modifications



Structural Modifications

- Changed horizontal stabilizer incidence
- Changed vertical stabilizer incidence
- Installed solid engine mounts
- Installed boil-off cooling system
- Reduced drag and gross weight



Assembly





Flight Control Modifications

- Reduced elevator inertia weight
- Increased elevator counterweights
- Increased rudder counterweight
- Fixed and faired right elevator trim tab
- Electrically actuated left elevator trim tab
- Filler and paint on elevator trim tabs
- Modifications increased pitch sensitivity
- Pitch trim system more susceptible to flutter



Elevator Inertia Weight





Elevator Counterweights





Left Right




Overbalanced Elevator





Trim Control






Left Elevator





Left Inboard Attachment Screw





Left Tab Link Assembly









Left Trim Tab Support



Right Elevator





Fixed Right Trim Tab





Right Tab Link Assembly










Trim Tab Actuator




Trim Tab Hinge





Examination-Hinges





Examination-Locknuts




New locknut




Ghost locknut



Trim Tab Hinges







Left IB

Left CTR


Left OB



Right IB



Right CTR



Right OB



Locknuts




Left Tab CTR



Left Tab OB



Left Aileron IB



Left Aileron CTR



Left Aileron OB



Examination-Links and Screw

- Link assemblies
 - Overload failure in bending
 - Compressive buckling deformation
 - Internal elevator damage
- Screw
 - Fatigue fracture 80%
 - Overload fracture 20%
 - Corrosion on fracture



Flight Test History

- Owner informed FAA about boil-off system
- No notification of other major modifications
- FAA recommended 3 hours with 3 takeoffs/landings
- No evidence flight testing was completed
- No engineering analyses or substantiation
- 24.7 hours total time before 2011 races

Indicators

- Fastest flight by about 35 knots
- Highest power settings
- Change in vibration amplitude and maximum load factor
- Tighten up loose trim tabs



Structural Deformation-Fuselage





Structural Deformation-Canopy





Flutter

- Aeroelastic phenomenon
- Rapid periodic motion, oscillation or vibration
- Stable or unstable
- Range from "buzz" to violent destructive failure
- Speed and structural stiffness govern



Flutter

Milestones in Flight History Dryden Flight Research Center



PA-30 Twin Commanche
Tail Flutter Test

April 5, 1966



Conclusions

- Loose screws reduced stiffness
- High race speeds
- Flutter of left trim tab
- Failure of left link assembly
- Uncommanded pitch up and high G
- Flutter of right trim tab
- Failure of right link assembly
- Separation of inboard left tab



Initiators

- Pilot input
- Mach buffet
- Atmospheric turbulence
- Trim runaway
- Wake encounter
- Link assembly failure

Probable Cause

The reduced stiffness of the elevator trim tab system that allowed aerodynamic flutter to occur at racing speeds. The reduced stiffness was a result of deteriorated locknut inserts that allowed the trim tab attachment screws to become loose and to initiate fatigue cracking in one screw sometime before the accident flight. Aerodynamic flutter of the trim tabs resulted in a failure of the left trim tab link assembly, elevator movement, high flight loads, and a loss of control.

Contributing to the accident were the undocumented and untested major modifications to the airplane's elevator trim control system and the pilot's operation of the airplane in the unique air racing environment without adequate flight testing.



Safety Recommendations

- Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
- National Air-racing Group (NAG)
 Unlimited Division
- Reno Air Racing Association (RARA)



Recommendation A-12-8, FAA Guidance on Air Racing

- FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 6, Section 3-151
- Advisory Circular (AC) 91-45C, Waivers: Aviation Events, Chapter 4
- FAA is revising Order and AC
- Open-Acceptable Response on July 25, 2012



Recommendations A-12-9 and -13, Aircraft Modifications and Airworthiness

- Engineering evaluation and/or flight demonstrations
- NAG will request and review data for 2012
- RARA emphasizing for 2012 and reviewing procedures



Recommendation A-12-10, Pre-race Technical Inspections

- System to track discrepancies
- New form for technical inspection
- All discrepancies signed off before flight on course



Recommendations A-12-11 and -16, G-load Effects on Pilots

- High-G awareness training
- New training program and briefing
- All pilots required to attend briefing



Recommendations A-12-12 and -17, G-suits Feasibility

- Evaluate feasibility of G-suits when racing
- Determined not feasible for this type of racing




Recommendations A-12-14 and -15, Race Course Design and Ramp Safety


- Evaluate course design
- Relocate fuel truck
- Install substantial barriers



Course Changes



Pylons 7, 8, and 9





Recommendations A-12-14 and -15, Race Course Design and Ramp Safety

- Fuel truck moved 1.5 miles away
- Substantial barriers installed





National Transportation Safety Board